Re: Preventing Denial of Service Attack In IPC Serialization
On Jun 23, 11:42 pm, jlind...@hotmail.com wrote:
That's not part of the serialization framework! It is part of the
application code. As it stands, it is a DOS vulnerability. That
vulnerability can be eliminated without touching even a *single* line
of the serialization framework, simply by limiting the value of
inbound_data_size .
What value should be chosen as a limit on inbound_data_size?
Don't ask me. Ask the person who will be deploying the application.
They will make an arbitrary decision based on such criteria as what
kind of a network the application is running on, how many clients are
anticipated, what amounts of data a typical client needs to transfer,
etc.
That person will not be the least bit interested in what kind of C++
serialization framework your application happens to use.
As I said before, whatever value "you" pick is probably the wrong
one. In any case, the 1MB value that was chosen before is probably
inappropriate.
It does not matter. After a bit of thinking over the past few days, I
have found a solution that works well enough. It does not require the
allocation of (large, arbitrary) buffers that you propose, which would
still result in DoS on some machines, like the PDA's we plan to use.
-Le Chaud Lapin-
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